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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
I. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HELD VIOLATED BY
ATTORNEYS WHO PREPARED WILLS NAMING THEMSELVES OR FAMILY
MEMBERS AS BENEFICIARIES WITHOUT FULLY DISCLOSING POTENTIAL
CONFLICTS
In In re Rentiers1 and In re Peeples2 the South Carolina Supreme
Court found two attorneys3 to have violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code)4 when they prepared wills naming themselves or
family members as beneficiaries without having fully disclosed poten-
tial conflicts of interest pursuant to Disciplinary Rule DR 5-101(A).5
With these holdings the court offered some guidance to attorneys
presented with a situation in which a client desires to name the attor-
ney-draftsman as a beneficiary in the instrument.
In Rentiers a client and long-time friend of the attorney's in-
structed the latter to prepare an instrument devising to himself a resi-
dence and an office building. When Rentiers declined, the client in-
1. 297 S.C. 33, 374 S.E.2d 672 (1988).
2. 297 S.C. 36, 374 S.E.2d 674 (1988).
3. The respondent in Peeples prepared the will in question after having been
elected a circuit court judge, but before he took office. Peeples, 297 S.C. at 37, 374 S.E.2d
at 675. Thus, the court reprimanded Peeples for violating both the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct. Id. at 40, 374 S.E.2d at 676-77. It held
that Peeple's attempt, after having taken office, to resolve certain legal matters for the
testator prior to her death constituted a violation of Canons 2B and 5F of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Id. at 40-41, 374 S.E.2d at 677.
Canon 2B states in pertinent part, "[A judge] should not lend the prestige of his
office to advance the private interests of others ... ." S.C. Sup. CT. R. 33, Canon 2B.
Canon 5F states in pertinent part, "A judge should not practice law." S.C. Sup. CT.
R. 33, Canon 5F.
This case represents the South Carolina Supreme Court's first public reprimand of a
sitting judge.
4. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32.
5. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 5-101(A). The rule states, "Except with the consent of
his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his
professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his
own financial, business, property, or personal interests." Id. (emphasis added).
The Peeples opinion indicates the decision was based on DR 5-105(A), which reads,
"A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent profes-
sional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the
acceptance of the proffered employment ...... Because this provision concerns the in-
fringement of a new client's interests on an existing client, this citation presumably was
given in error. The proper reference should have been to DR 5-101(A).
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sisted the will include a provision allowing the attorney to purchase the
property at half its market value. The attorney then drafted the in-
strument, but only after the client refused to retain another attorney
to do so.0 Subsequently, the client died and Rentiers exercised the op-
tion on the office building. A complaint was filed, after which time the
attorney reconveyed the property to the client's estate. The Hearing
Panel and Executive Committee found Rentiers' conduct violated the
Code. The supreme court agreed.
7
In Peeples the court examined the preparation of a will by the
respondent after he was elected a circuit judge, but before he took of-
fice. The will granted the respondent's daughters a remainder interest
in the client's estate. Like Rentiers, Peeples was a close friend of the
client-testator. Indeed, after taking office Judge Peeples continued to
act on behalf of his client-friend's interest." The court cited Rentiers to
support its holding that Peeple's actions violated the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, and also held that his actions violated the Code
of Judicial ConductY
Concern with the propriety of a draftsman including himself as a
beneficiary dates back to ancient Roman law. Roman law "decreed that
the writer of another's will should not mark down a legacy for him-
self."10 Such a strict prohibition, however, has been the exception
rather than the rule. 1 This fact is probably due to a belief that in
some circumstances a draftsman may include himself as beneficiary
while avoiding potential pitfalls related to such behavior. 2
The reasoning offered in support of pre-Code decisions condemn-
ing this behavior was aptly stated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
State v. Horan.13 The Horan court stated that "ordinary prudence re-
quires that such a will be drawn by some other lawyer of the testator's
own choosing so that any suspicion of undue influence is thereby
6. Rentiers, 297 S.C. at 34, 374 S.E.2d at 673. It is noteworthy that Ethical Con-
sideration EC 5-5 is directly on point. It reads, "Other than in exceptional circum-
stances, a lawyer should insist that an instrument in which his client desires to name
him beneficially be prepared by another lawyer selected by the client." S.C. Sup. CT. R.
32, EC 5-5. Ethical Considerations, however, are not binding in South Carolina. See S.C.
Sup. CT. R. 32, PREAMBLE AND PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.
7. See Rentiers, 297 S.C. at 34, 374 S.E.2d at 673.
8. See Peeples, 247 S.C. at 40-41, 374 S.E.2d at 677.
9. Id. at 40, 374 S.E.2d at 676-77; see supra note 3.
10. Annotation, Drawing Will or Deed under which he Figures as Grantee, Lega-
tee, or Devisee as Ground for Disciplinary Action against Attorney, 98 A.L.R.2D 1234,
1235 (1964).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1236. Pitfalls range from undue influence to rendering oneself unable to
testify in regard to the will. Id.
13. 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).
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avoided.' 1 4 The Wisconsin court concluded that an attorney should
draft a will in which he is a beneficiary only in limited circumstances
and after full disclosure. 15 Courts in other pre-Code decisions, while
advising against such conduct, have refused to find ethical violations,
citing the importance of fulfilling a client's wishes."6
Adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility did little to
simplify this issue, since it contains no provision directly on point.
17
Consequently, treatment of such conduct has varied among jurisdic-
tions. South Carolina, however, through its decisions in Rentiers and
Peeples, has aligned itself with other jurisdictions that have focused on
Disciplinary Rule DR 5-101(A) in resolving the issue."s
A number of courts have focused on undue influence, overreaching
or impaired attorney judgment to invalidate wills naming attorney-
drafters as beneficiaries.' 9 Other courts have emphasized the impor-
tance of fully disclosing the many legal ramifications associated with
drafting the instrument.20 Even though undue influence is often dis-
cussed in cases in which attorney-draftsmen have been named as bene-
ficiaries, its contribution to the analysis of Rentiers and Peeples is lim-
ited. The court did not find undue influence in either case, yet the
absence of such conduct was obviously not conclusive. 21 Analysis of
14. Id. at 72, 123 N.W.2d at 491.
15. Id. at 74, 123 N.W.2d at 492. The court apparently believed such circumstances
to have included instances in which the testator was a "personal friend or members of
his family or close relatives." Id.
16. See, e.g., State v. Richards, 165 Neb. 80, 84 N.W.2d 136 (1957).
17. See In re Barrick, 87 Ill. 2d 233, 237, 429 N.E.2d 842, 845 (1981). Unlike the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct directly
address the issue of attorney-draftsmen who are named as beneficiaries. Model Rule
1.8(c) reads, "A lawyer should not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person
related to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client,
including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(c) (1983).
18. See, e.g., Barrick, 87 Ml1. 2d 233, 429 N.E.2d 842. Interestingly, the Iowa Su-
preme Court in State v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 805
(1979), held that violation of an Ethical Consideration alone will support disciplinary
action. Id. at 840. This is unusual in that compliance with Ethical Considerations usually
is regarded as not mandatory. See supra note 6.
19. See, e.g., In re Tonkon, 292 Or. 660, 642 P.2d 660 (1982); State v. Horan, 21
Wis. 2d 66, 123 N.W.2d 488 (1963).
20. See, e.g., In re Vogel, 92 Ill. 2d 55, 440 N.E.2d 855 (1982); Barrick, 87 Ill. 2d
233, 429 N.E.2d 842; Disciplinary Bd. v. Amundson, 297 N.W.2d 433 (N.D. 1980). In
both Barrick and Amundson the disclosure requirement was satisfied by the attorney
informing the testator of concerns raised by his request and suggestions that indepen-
dent counsel be retained.
21. Indeed, the court in Peeples expressly noted that the parties agreed the respon-
dent had asserted no undue influence upon the testator in the drafting of the will. See
Peeples, 297 S.C. at 40 n.2, 374 S.E.2d at 676 n.2.
1989]
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these cases, therefore, will focus on the definition of "full disclosure"
and whether or not it has been accomplished.
The supreme court in Peeples failed to give any direct guidance as
to what is required to achieve "full disclosure." Instead, the court re-
ferred to its decision in Rentiers. The court in Rentiers focused on
cases requiring the attorney to advise the testator of potential
problems inherent when attorney-draftsmen are named as beneficiaries
in a will.22 Listing several of the problems that could have arisen be-
cause of Rentiers' failure to fully disclose, the court stated:
[Tihere is no evidence of [the testator's] having been informed that a
Will, drawn by an attorney-beneficiary, is vulnerable to attack upon
undue influence or that, in the event the Will is challenged, his credi-
bility as a witness would be impaired by his personal interest in the
outcome. Finally, Respondent failed to even advise [the testator] that
his counsel may well be affected by that very interest. 23
While this language is helpful in determining what might be consid-
ered when questions of full disclosure arise, it probably is unwise to
assume that mere compliance with this language would protect the at-
torney-beneficiary from potential trouble.
With its focus in Rentiers and Peeples on the "full disclosure"
language of DR 5-101(A), the South Carolina Supreme Court implied a
tolerance for exceptions to a general prohibition against an attorney
drafting an instrument in which he is a beneficiary. Its holdings in
those cases, however, indicate its tolerance will be minimal and exer-
cised only after close scrutinization of the attorney-beneficiary's
conduct.
Richard C. Webb
22. Rentiers, 297 S.C. at 35, 374 S.E.2d at 674.
23. Id. (citing, e.g., Vogel, 92 Ill. 2d 55, 440 N.E.2d 885; Horan, 21 Wis. 2d 66, 123
N.W.2d 488).
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